

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 235353 TOSEC 270601

NODIS

FOLLOWING MOSCOW 14951 SENT ACTION SECSTATE SEPT. 22;
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 14951

NODIS

PASS SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: HARRIMAN-BREZHNEV MEETING, SEPT 20, 1976

1. GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV RECEIVED ME IN HIS OFFICE
ON THE THIRD FLOOR OF THE FORMER SENATE BUILDING IN THE
KREMLIN 11 A.M. MONDAY, SEPT 20. HE WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV; PETER SWIERS WAS WITH
ME. SUKHODREV INTERPRETED. BREZHNEV LOOKED FIT, VIGOROUS
AND SPOKE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME
TOUGH THINGS TO SAY ON BOTH SIDES, I NOTED THAT THE
GENERAL SECRETARY MADE A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A
CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT OUR MEETING, WHICH
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LASTED 2 3/4 HOURS. THE PRESS RELEASE WHICH WE AGREED ON
AT THE END REFERRED TO THE MEETING AS "FRANK AND FRIENDLY".
CARTER, SALT, IMMIGRATION AND CAMPAIGN RHETORIC WERE
THE MAIN SUBJECTS. (IN THIS MESSAGE, I HAVE OMITTED
FOR OBVIOUS REASONS CERTAIN OF MY EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT
I BELIEVED TO BE GOVERNOR CARTER'S POSITIONS, BUT IN

NO CASE DID I MAKE ANY COMMENT THAT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH SUPPORT FOR THE GOALS OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION.)

2. OUR CONVERSATION STARTED WITH THE USUAL CORDIALITIES AND GREETINGS AND BREZHNEV INQUIRED AS TO HOW I HAD BEEN SPENDING MY DAYS IN MOSCOW. I NOTED I HAD SEEN ARBATOV AND WHILE COMPLIMENTING THE USA INSTITUTE ON THEIR INTELLIGENCE, PROTECTED ARBATOV BY ADDING THAT HE UNDERSTANDS OUR FAULTS AND IS FRANK IN TELLING US ABOUT THEM. BREZHNEV SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT SOMEONE UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. SINCE HE DID NOT. I TOLD THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT I WISHED TO APPLAUD HIS CONSTANT COMMITMENT TO PEACE. HE THANKED ME AND SHOWED ME A RECENT UKRAINE PUBLICATION WHICH HE PROMISED TO SEND TO ME. HE SAID THAT IT WAS PUT OUT ON THE OCCASION OF THE INSTALLATION OF A BUST OF HIM IN HIS "HOME TOWN" WHEN HE BECAME TWICE A HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION, ALEKSANDROV INTERJECTED A DOUBLE HERO RATES A BUST IN HIS HOME TOWN; IN BREZHNEV'S CASE, DNEPRODZERZHINSK. BREZHNEV SAID THAT WAS NICE BUT HE BROUGHT OUT THE BOOK NOT TO EMPHASIZE THE HONOR BUT THE WORDS "FIGHTER FOR PEACE." HE SAID THESE WORDS EXPRESSED THE HOPE AND ASPIRATION OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND SHOWED ME SEVERAL PICTURES OF PLACES WHERE HE HAD SPENT HIS MINORITY AND SAID HE WOULD HONOR MY REQUEST TO SIGN THE INSCRIPTION PAGE.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT ONE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES OF OUR RELATIONS IS MISUNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES. I REPEATED THE 1974 REMARK THAT THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE IN THE U.S. WHO HAVE UNDUE FEAR OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. I SAID THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY MIGHT BE SURPRISED TO KNOW THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE PROPAGANDA GOING ABOUT THE U.S. THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARING A FIRST STRIKE AS EVIDENCED BY AN ALLEGEDLY VERY ACTIVE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AGAINST A SECOND STRIKE. BREZHNEV SHOOK HIS HEAD SADLY AND COMMENTED THAT THEY DON'T KNOW THAT THERE WOULD BE A SECOND STRIKE IN A HALF HOUR. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS MAKES IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SIDES GIVE ACCURATE INFORMATION, NOT OF COURSE OF THE DETAILS OF WARHEADS, BUT OF THE FACT OF THEIR CAPABILITIES SO THAT PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES KNEW THAT NEITHER COUNTRY HAS ANY INTENTION OF A FIRST STRIKE.

4. I ASKED THE GENERAL SECRETARY FOR SOME FRIENDLY GESTURE OR STATEMENT OF INTENTION SOMETIME BEFORE OR AFTER THE ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD START CARTER--OR PRESIDENT FORD IF HE SHOULD BE THE WINNER--OFF IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. I WENT ON THAT I DID NOT LIKE TO SAY ANYTHING UNKIND

ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV, WHOM I BOTH KNEW AND ADMIRER, BUT I MUST CITE HIS UNFORTUNATELY WARLIKE SPEECH OF JANUARY 6, 1961 WHICH STARTED OUR RELATIONS OFF BADLY AND LEAD TO UNFORTUNATE THINGS IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. BASKET 111 IS AN IMPORTANT PROVISION OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT AND IS TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS IS NOT A MATTER WHICH CAN BE PUT UNDER THE RUG. IT MUST BE THRASHED OUT TO KEEP IT FROM BECOMING A SUBJECT OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN US. (BREZHNEV EVIDENTLY DOES NOT APPRECIATE HOW STRONGLY AMERICANS FEEL ABOUT SOVIET FAILURE TO CARRY OUR FULLY BASKET 111 PROVISIONS.) WE HAVE DIFFERENT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS BUT OUR ACTIONS MUST NOT TAKE EACH OTHER BY SURPRISE. (I HAD ANGOLA IN MIND.) (HERE BREZHNEV NOTED TO ALEKSANDROV THAT THIS WAS QUITE A BIT. ALEXANDROV RESPONDED TO HIM THAT IT WAS MUCH FOR BREZHNEV BUT IT WAS NECESSARY.)

5. I CONTINUED THAT I HAD TWO OTHER POINTS: FIRST, THERE HAD BEEN AN OVERSELLING OF DETENTE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I KNEW THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY RESPECTED PRESIDENT NIXON, BUT WHEN HE WAS IN TROUBLE AT HOME, I BELIEVED HE EXAGGERATED THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF DETENTE. AMERICANS HAD BECOME, OR AS ONE WISE MAN SAID, WE HAD BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH OUR OWN ILLUSIONS. I RECALLED THAT SECRETARY BREZHNEV HAD SAID TO ME IN 1974 THAT

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PATIENCE, PERSEVERANCE, AND STEP-BY-STEP ACTION WAS REQUIRED FOR PROGRESS. HE HAD MADE THIS VERY CLEAR TO ME (WHEN I, USED THE WORD ILLUSION, ALEXANDROV INTERJECTED THAT THEY WERE SUBSTANTIAL ILLUSIONS).

MY SECOND POINT WAS THAT THE CAMPAIGN REAGAN CONDUCTED HAD STIRRED UP ANTI-SOVIET EMOTIONS WHICH IN MY OPINION HAD AN EFFECT ON BOTH THE FORD AND CARTER CAMPAIGNS. THESE ARE EMOTIONS WHICH CAN BE AND MUST BE OVERCOME. I TOLD THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT I WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS OR TAKE ANY MESSAGES.

6. PARTLY READING AND PARTLY EXTEMPORIZING, GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR MY DETAILED COMMENTS ON STRATEGIC ARMS, BASKET 111 AND OTHER TOPICS. BREZHNEV SAID THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR WHAT I HAD SAID. HE SAID THAT AS REGARDS THE GENERAL SOVIET APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., HE TRUSTED THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE ME, BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS THAT THE SOVIET UNION STEADFASTLY SEEKS RELATIONS WHICH WILL PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS CONVINCED THAT FOR SUCH DEVELOPMENT THERE MUST EXIST CERTAIN NECESSARY, OBJECTIVE PRE-

REQUISITES AND A GOOD FOUNDATION. HE EXPLAINED THAT AS THE RESULT OF EFFORTS, WHICH WERE NOT SIMPLE BUT WERE WHAT HE WOULD CALL ENORMOUS, WE NOW HAVE ACCORDS AND UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE ACHIEVED IMPROVEMENTS NOT ONLY IN U.S. - USSR RELATIONS BUT FOR THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. PICKING UP MY WORD, HE SAID THESE ARE NOT ILLUSIONS AND, ALEKSANDROV ADDED, THEY ARE REAL FACTS.

7. BREZHNEV SAID HE HAD TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT WAS NO FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE PROCESS HAD SLOWED DOWN, THAT ON SEVERAL MAJOR ISSUES THERE HAD BEEN A FAIRLY PROTRACTED PAUSE. HE SAID THAT I HAD SPOKEN OF THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC ARMS. HE AGREED WITH ME. INDEED THIS WAS THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT AND HE HAD TO MAKE ONE REMARK. HE NOTED THAT ON MARCH 16 THE SOVIETS HAD SENT PRESIDENT FORD THEIR LATEST PROPOSAL BUT HAD AS YET RECEIVED NO ANSWER. HE ASKED, WHAT DOES CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT MEAN? HE SAID THAT SURELY IF THAT IS THE ATTITUDE NOW TAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION, IT IS NOT A TOKEN OF WILLINGNESS OR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT.

8. BREZHNEV CONTINUED THAT THIS OF COURSE RESULTS IN THE SOVIETS HARBORING A WARINESS OF TRENDS IN AMERICAN POLICY. HE NOTED THE TREND MANIFESTED ITSELF FIRST AND FOREMOST IN A RENEWED ARMS RACE AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY BUDGET WHICH HE BELIEVED WAS A RECORD ONE. HE COMPLAINED THAT ALL OF THIS WAS TO THE LOUD ACCOMPANIMENT OF A MYTHICAL SOVIET THREAT FOR WHICH THERE WERE NO GROUNDS.

9. BREZHNEV CONTINUED THAT OBVIOUSLY FORCES WERE AT WORK HERE (IN THE SOVIET UNION) WHO DO NOT LIKE EITHER RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION OR DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. HE UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S METING IT OUT TO THESE FORCES FOR REASONS OF A MOMENTARY NATURE BUT HE FELT THIS WAS A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT.

10. HE THEN SAID ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF RELATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION IS PURSUING A CONSISTENT LINE. HE EMPHASIZED IT WAS A LINE CONFIRMED BY THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. THE SOVIETS WERE IN FAVOR OF NOT ABATING EFFORTS. THEY WERE PREPARED TO INTERACT AND COOPERATE WITH ALL THOSE WHO TAKE A SIMILAR APPROACH.

11. BREZHNEV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BY NO MEANS INSENSITIVE TO THE POLITICAL LINE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS FOLLOWED VERY CLOSELY THE STATEMENTS OF BOTH THE CANDIDATES. (COMMENT: THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH A POINT ARBATOV MADE TO ME ON

SEPT 18 THAT MANY HIGH-LEVEL SOVIETS ARE TAKING OUR
CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS VERY SERIOUSLY, PERHAPS TOO SERIOUSLY.)

12. BREZHNEV WENT ON THAT I HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE
OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS
WERE IN FAVOR OF NEITHER SIDE HAVING AN ADVANTAGE; RATHER
THAT EQUILIBRIUM BE THE RESULT. IT WAS NOT HARD FOR
THE SOVIETS TO DETECT THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE IN THE SALT
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TALKS WAS SEEKING TO AVOID ANY LIMITATION ON CERTAIN OF
ITS OWN TYPES OF ARMS SUCH AS THE STRATEGIC CRUISE
MISSILE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ATTEMPTING TO EXTEND
THAT DEFINITION TO SOVIET WEAPONS WHICH BY NO MEANS
HAD STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES. HE SAID THAT HE WAS REFERRING
TO THE SOVIET BOMBER WHICH WAS USUALLY CALLED THE BACKFIRE
IN THE U.S. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS
ABSOLUTELY NOT A GOOD APPROACH, THAT THE AGREE-
MENT MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUILIBRIUM,
THAT THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO ACHIEVE A STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION AGREEMENT. BREZHNEV ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH
HE DIDN'T WISH TO GO INTO IT AGAIN IN DETAIL SINCE HE
HAS SAID IT PUBLICLY, HE HAS MADE PROPOSALS TO BAN
THE TRIDENT AND THE B-1, AND SIMILAR WEAPONS IN THE
SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY
THE U.S. AND CONSTRUCTION WAS CONTINUING. (I INTER-
JECTED THAT ONLY THE TRIDENT WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
AND BREZHNEV RESPONDED THAT HE KNEW THAT THE B-1 WAS
NOW BEING TESTED.) BREZHNEV ADDED THAT THE SOVIET PRO-
POSAL FOR A BAN ON UNDERGROUND TESTING HAD
NOT BEEN ACCEPTED.

13. BREZHNEV WENT ON, LAUGHING AS HE SAID IT, THAT IN
GENERAL ON EVERY ISSUE THE TWO CANDIDATES SEEM TO TRY
TO VIE IN OUTSPEAKING THE OTHER, THAT PERHAPS THIS
WAS AN AMERICAN CUSTOM. HE RECALLED THAT IN A RECENT
"JEWISH-ZIONIST" CONGRESS, ONE OF THEM ANNOUNCED
SUPPORT FOR THE "POOR SOVIET JEWS" AND THEN THE OTHER
DID IT AS WELL. (I TOOK EXCEPTION TO THIS.) AGAIN
WITH SOME HEAVY HUMOR, BREZHNEV SAID I SHOULD NOT THINK
HE WAS TRYING TO ATTACK GOVERNOR CARTER BECAUSE HE HAD
NO INTENTION OF HEAPING PARISE ON PRESIDENT FORD EITHER.
HE CONTINUED THAT HE HAD READ THE OTHER DAY THAT
PRESIDENT FORD HAD RECEIVED IN THE WHITE HOUSE THE
UKRAINIAN CARDINAL SEPY WHO HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM
THE USSR AND WHOM EVEN THE POPE HAD FORBIDDEN TO CON-
TINUE POLITICAL ACTIVITY. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY
WHETHER PRESIDENT FORD WAS TRYING TO BE MORE CATHOLIC
THAN THE POPE. I RESPONDED BY SAYING WHY NOT, AND THE
GENERAL SECRETARY LAUGHED.
I SAID THAT THERE ARE MANY UKRAINIANS IN THE U.S.
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AND ANY PRESIDENT MUST GIVE THEIR CONCERNS A HEARING. I AM SURE THAT THE ACTION WAS NOT ANTI-SOVIET. I CONTINUED THAT THIS WAS GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHY THE GENERAL SECRETARY SHOULD NOT PAY ATTENTION TO CAMPAIGN RHETORIC: THAT HE MUST DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THIS AND POLICY.

14. BREZHNEV THEN ASKED WHAT WAS THE TRUE PICTURE: WHAT WERE PEOPLE TO THINK. HE SAID THAT HE RECALLED MEETING CERTAIN STATESMEN FOR THE FIRST TIME, SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THEM PERSONALLY BUT HE HAD HEARD WHAT THEY SAID. THEREFORE, HOW WAS HE TO KNOW ABOUT GOVERNOR CARTER AND PRESIDENT FORD? HERE BREZHNEV TURNED TO ALEKSANDROV AND SAID, "AM I INTERFERING IN U.S. INTERNAL AFFAIRS?" HE THEN TURNED AGAIN TO ME TO SAY THAT WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM HELPED. I THEN SAID THAT I DIDN'T BLAME THE GENERAL SECRETARY AT ALL FOR BEING CONFUSED AND WHEN HE WAS FINISHED WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE.

15. BREZHNEV SAID HE WANTED TO TELL ME ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT ON THE SUBJECT OF TRADE AND COMMERCIAL TIES: PLEASE PLACE NO PRESSURE ON THE USSR; "ALL" ARE IN FAVOR OF DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT. PROMISES HAVE BEEN MADE BUT THE CART WAS STILL RIGHT WHERE IT WAS. AND THE SENATE AND CONGRESS CONTINUED TO TRY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE NOTED THAT A PACKAGE DEAL HAD BEEN EXPECTED AND THE SOVIETS HAD PROMISED LEND-LEASE REPAYMENT.

16. BREZHNEV THEN ASKED ME NOT TO MISUNDERSTAND BUT SAID HE HAD TO MENTION THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN AN UNSEEMLY ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MIG-25 WHICH HAD MADE A "FORCED LANDING" IN JAPAN.

17. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE TOOK NOTE OF MY MENTION OF THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS 117,458 JEWS HAD LEFT. HE CHUCKLED THAT WHERE THEY WENT, GOD ONLY KNEW. THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO GO TO ISRAEL BUT OFTEN
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TURNED UP ELSEWHERE. HE ALLEGED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS APPLIED ONLY TO THOSE WITH STRATEGIC SECRETS AND THAT IN THE PAST FIVE AND ONE-HALF YEARS THERE HAD BEEN 2027 REJECTIONS OR A TOTAL OF ONLY 1.5 PERCENT OF THOSE ALLOWED TO LEAVE. I ASKED HOW MANY WERE NOW LEFT OF THE 2000 AND HE SAID THAT NUMBER REMAINED.

18. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS FINISHED WITH ALL HIS SCOLDINGS, HE SAID NO, HE HAD ONE MORE AND ASKED WHY ON EARTH HAD SECRETARY KISSINGER TAKEN IT INTO HIS HEAD TO GO TRAVELING ALL OVER AFRICA. HE SAID HE EVEN THOUGHT ABOUT IT IN BED* HE COUNDN'T DO IT SITTING UP. MORE SERIOUSLY, HE SAID IN IRONIC MANNER THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SECRETARY KISSINGER'S DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN REACTIONARY REGIMES CONDEMNED BY THE UN. HE WENT ON THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO GO INTO THAT PART FURTHER, BUT ON NAMIBIA, SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS ACTING COUNTER TO THE UN RESOLUTION WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT A TWO YEAR PERIOD BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. BREZHNEV NOTED THAT HE WAS SAYING THIS IN SPITE OF MANY AND FRUITFUL MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY BUT OF COURSE HE ALSO TALKED TO HIM FRANKLY.

19. I BEGAN MY RESPONSE BY SAYING THAT I FELT AS I DID WHEN A LITTLE BOY BEING CALLED UP BY THE HEADMASTER TO ATONE NOT ONLY FOR MY FAULTS BUT FOR THE MISDEED OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF MY CLASS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY MEANING. AFTER MAKING A FEW COMMENTS ON WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE GOVERNOR CARTER'S POSITION, I CONTINUED THAT I WAS GOING TO TRY TO DEFEND PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON SALT. I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD BEEN CHALLENGED FOR THE REPUBLICAN NOMINATION BY THEREPUBLICAN RIGHT WING REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR REAGAN. I SAID IT WAS FAIR TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT FORD'S HANDS WERE TIED DURING THIS PERIOD BECAUSE IF HE HAD ACTED OTHERWISE, GOVERNOR REAGAN WOULD HAVE ACCUSED HIM OF GIVING IN NO MATTER WHAT THE DEAL WAS. THE SALT SUBJECTS ARE SO COMPLICATED THAT IT IS EASIER TO CRITICIZE THAN TO EXPLAIN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITIONS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
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20. BREZHNEV INTERRUPTED LAUGHINGLY THAT HE WAS GOING TO BRING TO GOVERNOR CARTER'S ATTENTION THAT I HAD ATTEMPTED TO DEFEND PRESIDENT FORD.

21. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN CONSTANTLY TRYING TO FIND SOME COMPOSITION ON THE BACKFIRE-CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE ACCEPTABLE IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. THAT I UNDERSTOOD GOVERNOR CARTER HAD RECOGNIZED THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN AGREEMENT BUT THAT HE WAS AGAINST MAKING POLITICAL CAPITAL BY ATTACKING IT. GOVERNOR CARTER FELT THAT THE EARLIER THERE WAS A FAIR AGREEMENT TO LIMIT ARMS, THE EARLIER WE COULD MOVE TO REDUCE ARMS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY THEN COMMENTED THAT THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT HAD BEEN TALKED ABOUT AT VLADIVOSTOK--AS SOON AS A SALT 11 AGREEMENT

WAS SIGNED, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS.

22. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS APPARENTLY A LARGE FLOW OF INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING UP THEIR CONVENTIOANAL FORCES IN EUROPE--MORE TANKS, MORE TROOPS AND QUALITY OF EQUIPMENT. I THEN ASKED IF I MIGHT TAKE THE ROLE OF SCHOOL TEACHER, SINCE I HAD BEEN A PUPIL FOR AWHILE. BREZHNEV SAID, PLEASE, PLEASE. I SAID THAT I HAD ONCE GIVEN AN OPINION TO CHURCHILL ABOUT BRITISH POLITICS WHICH HE DID NOT LIKE. CHURCHILL LECTURED ME THAT NO ONE COULD UNDERSTAND THE POLITICS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY: FEW WERE SO GIFTED AS TO UNDERSTAND THE POLITICS OF THEIR OWN. I SAID I WANTED TO EXPLAIN SOMETHING CONCERNING THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S. IN 1940 THERE WERE TWO REPUBLICANS RUNNING FOR THE NOMINATION FOR PRESIDENT--TAFT, WHO WAS COMPLETELY AN ISOLATIONIST, AND WILKIE, WHO WAS MORE SENSIBLE. I, AS A DEMOCRAT, CONTRIBUTED TO WILKIE TO HELP GET THE NOMINATION FROM TAFT. DRAWING A DIAGRAM, I THEN EXPLAINED THAT IF ONE LOOKS AT TAFT ON THE EXTREME RIGHT, ROOSEVELT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO MOVE TO THE RIGHT EVEN THOUGH HE WOULD STILL BE LEFT OF TAFT. HOWEVER, IF WILKIE WERE IN THE CENTER, THEN
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ROOSEVELT COULD REMAIN ON THE LEFT. IN A SIMILAR MANNER IN 1976, FORD WAS PULLED FARTHER TO THE RIGHT BY REAGAN. CARTER, ALTHOUGH STILL LEFT OF FORD, HAD TO MOVE TO THE RIGHT IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING ISOLATED. I SAID IF THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED--THAT IS, IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN A REAGAN PULLING FORD TO THE RIGHT, I THINK THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. BREZHNEV COMMENTED THAT AMERICAN POLITICS WERE A COMPLICATED ISSUE.

23. I CONTINUED THAT CONCERNING BREZHNEV'S QUESTION ABOUT THE SECRETARY IN AFRICA, I DID NOT KNOW TOO MUCH ABOUT IT BUT DID NOT THINK IT WOULD DO HIS COUNTRY ANY GOOD TO IMPUGN AMERICAN MOTIVES PUBLICLY. (BREZHNEV TURNED TO ALEKSANDROV SAYING, "WE MADE IT PUBLIC?" AND SEEMED NOT TO REALIZE WHAT PRAVDA HAD BEEN SAYING). I CONTINUED THAT I COULD REPUDIATE HIS STATEMENT WITH GREAT ASSURANCES--NAMELY, THAT THE BLACK VOTE AND THOSE OPPOSED TO DISCRIMINATION REPRESENT A LARGE PART OF OUR POPULATION. NO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE COULD COME OUT FOR WHITE SUPREMACY WITHOUT INSURING HIS DEFEAT.

24. I GAVE THE GENERAL SECRETARY A COPY OF MY MEMOIRS OF 1941-1946. I NOTED THAT I HOPED THAT

ONE DAY IT COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO RUSSIAN AS IT HAD NOT BEEN BADLY REVIEWED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. THE GENERAL SECRETARY CAME AROUND THE TABLE TO EXPRESS HIS THANKS AND TO ASK ME TO ACCEPT HIS HAND. THE GENERAL SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SAY ONCE AGAIN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE FAVORABLE TO A MEETING WITH THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION, WHOEVER WAS ELECTED. HE THANKED ME FOR THE MEETING, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE INFORMATION I HAD GIVEN HIM AND PICKED UP A WORK MADE OF SEMI-PRECIOUS URAL STONES TO GIVE ME. I THEN GAVE HIM A PAIR OF CUFF LINKS THAT I SAID MY WIFE HAD MADE SURE I BROUGHT ALONG.

25. AS WE MOVED TOWARD THE DOOR BREZHNEV RESPONDED TO MY INQUIRY ABOUT CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN, WHOM I HAD KNOWN SINCE 1942. BREZHNEV TOLD ME THAT KOSYGIN WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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EXPECTED TO BE BACK AT WORK IN A FEW WEEKS. I ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE CROP THIS YEAR; BREZHNEV NOTED THAT THE HARVEST WAS EXPECTED TO BE BETTER EVEN THAN IN 1973 WHICH WAS A RECORD YEAR. HE LAUGHED THAT THE AMERICAN PROJECTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET HARVEST KEPT RISING EVERY WEEK. SALT CAME UP AS A POINT AGAIN AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY ASKED ME TO REMEMBER ONE MORE IMPORTANT POINT--THAT HE HAD DEDICATED HIS LIFE TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR. WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION, HE NOTED ONE BOMB FALLS AND WE HAVE A WORLD WAR. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THE VALUE OF THE SOVIETS SAYING SOMETHING TO RELIEVE TENSIONS WHICH WOULD THEN MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT TO RESPOND. I SAID I WAS GLAD THAT BREZHNEV DID NOT TALK OF LIBERATION WARS THE WAY KHRUSHCHEV DID: HE SPOKE ONLY OF SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

26. WE CONCLUDED OUR CONVERSATION BY ASKING ABOUT THE PRESS AND ALEKSANDROV PRODUCED A STATEMENT WHICH WITH MINOR CHANGES WAS AGREED TO. I EMPHASIZED THAT I WAS AGAIN HERE AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN. AS WE REACHED THE DOOR, BREZHNEV PULLED MY ASSISTANT ASIDE FOR A MINUTE AND ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT THE CONVERSATION HAD GONE WELL, TO WHICH MY ASSISTANT REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. ALEKSANDROV MADE A POINT OF HIS OWN TO MY ASSISTANT JUST AS WE ASKED THE SOVIETS TO UNDERSTAND CAMPAIGN RHETORIC, WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT ALWAYS CONTROL THEIR PRESS--AS IN THE CASE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIP TO AFRICA* MATLOCK UNQUOTE HABIB

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